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Book Reviews
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION

IN

THE HISTORY OF

THE UNITED

STATES, by William W. Crosskey. University of Chicago Press,

Chicago, 1953. 2 vols. $20.00.
Some 166 years ago, as everyone knows, a group of men
foregathered in Convention at Philadelphia, and framed the
Constitution of the United States. In this revered, but antiquated, document, replete with examples of confused and imperfect draftsmanship, they set up a federal government of three
separate, co-ordinate and co-equal departments, carefully confining, within limits of varying scope, the enumerated powers
of the legislative branch, thereby saving to the respective sovereign states all other powers of government. The framers set
up a Supreme Court, whose great tasks, requiring intuitions of
statesmanship of the highest order, were to be: (1) the maintenance of this carefully devised system of "federalism," and
(2) the guardianship of the document, by a general review of
legislative acts, both national and state, for conformity to its
mandates. We know, further, that, to remove any doubts about
the whole matter, a series of amendments was very shortly
thereafter adopted, which further restrained the Congress, and
concluded with a general reaffirmation of state sovereignty in
those areas not given over to the national government.
That all this "just ain't so"-that is, that the framers did not
do a very great many of the things they are orthodoxly supposed
to have done-has now been demonstrated conclusively by the
writer of the volumes under review. In this lucidly-written,
richly-documented study, Mr. Crosskey, a professor of law in
the University of Chicago, has published the initial two volumes
of a work which will be a bombshell to traditional historians,
an important new source for lawyers, judges, and political
scientists, and a revelation to thoughtful citizens everywhere.
What method has the author employed in fashioning this
two-volume bombshell? The answer is simple: A major portion
of the volumes is devoted to applying to our fundamental constitutive document, the orthodox rule of interpretation, that "We
ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean
[638)
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in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the
circumstances in which they were used."'
His analysis begins with the Commerce Clause. On the
basis of a prodigious research into eighteenth-century word
usages, the author shows, among other things, that "Commerce"
refers to the entire complex of gainful economic activities carried
on in this country, and that "States," as used in the Commerce
Clause, refers to "the people" of the States.2 The fact that that
Congressional power over commerce is free of any "interstate"
limitation obviously throws a very great many of the remaining
elements of the Constitution into a new light.
The "newness" of this light will be apparent from the following exceedingly brief sketch of the major conclusions which
emerge from Mr. Crosskey's researches. The Congress was
intended to enjoy a general national legislative authority,3 with
4
quite extensive powers over the forms of the state governments,
and with supremacy over the other two departments of the
national government. All of the powers of Congress enumerated
in the Constitution were enumerated for reasons which have
nothing whatever to do with "States Rights." 5 Indeed, very far
from having such "State Rights," the states were meant to play
a distinctly subordinate role in governing the country, and the
Tenth Amendment, far from changing this situation, was intended
as, and, when understood, is a clear re-affirmation of the arrangements devised at Philadelphia in 1787.6
Nor is this all. Incredible as this may seem, the Supreme
Court was intended to function as the supreme juridical head of
the country, paramount to all other courts in the country, exer1. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417
(1899).
2. Pp. 50-186.
3. It may be important to be clear on this potentially controversial point.
By "a general national legislative authority" Mr. Crosskey does not mean
"a power to supplant the legislature of any particular state." The state
legislatures were, in general, continued for local state legislation. The general power apparently intended to be given to Congress was a general power
of nation-wide legislation; a power to deal with matters, less than nationwide, that transcended the competence of a single state; and a power to deal
even with matters confined to a single state when of concern to any other
state, or states, or to the nation (p. 363).
4. The scope of Congressional authority over voting in the states, under
the "Time, Place, and Manner" provisions of Art. I, and the national guaranty of a "Republican Form of Government" to "every State" in Art. IV, is
vastly greater than it is currently thought to be. Cf. pp. 522-541.
5. Pp. 409-508.
6. Pp. 675-708.
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cising a general superintendence over them in all branches of
law, and settling and declaring in the last resort a uniform rule
of civil justice. 7 Nor did the framers intend that the Supreme
Court, in discharging this important function, should review the
acts of Congress for constitutionality; it was intended, however,
that the Court should ignore Congressional acts, where this
8
might be necessary to preserve its judiciary prerogatives intact.
Finally, the whole Bill of Rights was meant to be valid
against state governmental action,9 a view re-emphasized in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The latter was not, however, designed
to confer on the Supreme Court a general roving commission
which has given us the very queer thing known as "substantive
due process."'10
This "unitary" view of the historically intended character
and structure of our national government will, perhaps, come to
some readers with all the hideous novelty of an attack of plague.
For those readers who may believe the whole view is incredible,
Mr. Crosskey includes, in the course of his discussion, extended
analyses of the political and, particularly, the legal, history of
the early years of the government. For example, the history of
the Commerce Clause is carried forward to Gibbons v. Ogden,
and the case is shown to possess a character quite different from
that usually imputed to it.11 Again, by extended research in the
early cases, Mr. Crosskey demonstrates that the intended character of the Supreme Court as the supreme juridical head of the
country was understood, and acted upon, by courts and lawyers
of the period. 12
To say that these volumes are "a great contribution" is to
indulge in pale understatement. The many persons who are
interested in comprehensive reform of our chaotic commercial
law will find much useful material here, as will those interested
in FEPC, or corporation law reform, or the rationalizing of the
"conflict of laws." Citizens who are concerned over state violations of the Bill of Rights are given invaluable ammunition, and
those concerned with the state of political enfranchisement
throughout the nation will necessarily recur frequently to these
volumes. And citizens who have long thought something should
7. Pp. 563-674.

8. The discussion of judicial review is found at pp. 938-1046.
9. Pp. 1056-1082.
10. Pp. 1083-1158.
11. Pp. 187-291.

12. Pp. 711-753.
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be done to put an end to the many indefensible "interstate trade
13
barriers" will find a persuasive brief ready at hand.
For at least nine men in Washington the book is required
reading. The absolute unconstitutionality of the 1938 volte-face
in Erie v. Tompkins is now demonstrated beyond question. If
the Supreme Court were then willing to rely on a piece of mis14
leading research published in the Harvard Law Review, by so
much more they ought now to rely on Mr. Crosskey's really
thorough analysis, overrule Erie, and get to their intended work
as the supreme head of a general and nation-wide system for
establishing Justice, as is provided by the document they have
all solemnly sworn to uphold.
Scholars in many fields will be interested in these and subsequent volumes. 15 The "dictionary of terms" which the author
has constructed will be of the first importance to the philologers.
American historians will now be obliged to re-examine (and,
perhaps, revise) a great many of their notions, as will the
political scientists. The idolators of the late Thomas Jefferson
and the late James Madison will, in these volumes, find good
6
reasons to pause in their devotions. I even venture to think that
some law professors will be led to look at their familiar cases
with new vision.
While this general reassessment of ideas proceeds apace,
this reviewer would join in the sentiment manifested in the dedication of these volumes: "To the Congress of the United States,
in the hope that it may be led to claim and exercise for the common good of the country, the powers justly belonging to it under
the Constitution."
William B. Jeffrey, Jr.*
by Monroe Berger. Columbia University
Press, New York City, New York, 1952. Pp. ix, 238. $3.25.

EQUALITY BY STATUTE,

This is a book that should be read by every person who
possesses views on the subject of legislation in the field of race
13. Pp. 295-323.
14. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1923).

15. From the many hints scattered through these initial volumes, it would
seem that at least two more volumes will be necessary to the completion of
the work. Cf. especially pp. 6, 12, 82, 187, 510, 535.

16. For example, consider the perfectly fantastic frenzied maneuvers in

the subversive campaign issuing in
Coolidge, recounted at pp. 754-784.

U.S. v. Hudson d Goodwin and U.S. v.

0 Assistant Law Librarian, Yale Law Library.

